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The conventional wisdom about European arms
suppliers holds that these nations are motivated
primarily by financial considerations when faced with a
decision to sell arms. This paper argues that the
economic rationale is becoming less important in the
Italian case. The evidence suggests that as Italy moves
into the next decade, the political rationale will
become more important. Italy is using arms transfers
for reasons of policy rather than economics. There are
three reasons for this change. First, the Italian
government has recently instituted a number of changes
in the arms transfer mechanism designed to increase
control over the export process. Second, the new and
still developing defense policy offers Italy an
opportunity to use arms sales to increase Italy's power
in the Mediterranean. Finally, the Italian nation, long
the objects of scorn from their northern European
neighbors, is gaining a sense of pride in its
accomplishments. Italy's gross national product exceeds
that of Great Britain. Italian technology is becoming
increasingly in demand. These developments have
resulted in Italy being treated as a serious
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The export of arms by the industrialized countries
of the world affects not only the countries receiving
the weapons, but also those that do the exporting. As
in any debate, there are several aspects to consider.
One can question the morality of manufacturing and
exporting ever-increasing numbers of lethal arms to
those countries of the world that are known as "trouble
spots" and denounce those who make the decisions to
transfer arms for increasing the risk of war.
Conversely, one could argue that these "trouble spot"
countries will buy from any country that makes the arms
available. The morality of the issue is not questioned;
rather these "pro-arms transfer" proponents argue that
they view the issue pragmatically--in purely economic
and political terms. The major European exporters--
Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy--are
often accused of using arms exports to subsidize their
own defense and defense industries, an illustration of
this latter school of thought.
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Most agree that the arms trade can be quite
profitable. Defense industries in an exporting country
regularly show profits, thus staying in business and
maintaining the national defense industrial base for
any crisis that may arise. Because the price of weapons
is spread over greater numbers, the governments of
exporting countries are able to develop and produce
weapons for less cost.
Economies of scale, longer production runs, and
unemployment are but a few of the "economic rationales"
for arms transfers. To assert, however, that these
rationales are sufficient justification for the sale of
weapons, especially in the European countries and
specifically Italy, is misleading. Ulrich Albrecht, in
the Summer 1986 issue of the Journal of International
Affairs , makes such a claim:
Italian arms exports are especially notable for
being commercially mot i vated . . . I taly (insists) on
maintaining an independent arms industry, not for
the traditional reasons of autarky, but for reasons
of technology and employment policies. This
decision necessitates an active arms export policy,
with little consideration for foreign policy
concerns . -'
Since the late 1970's, there has been a movement,
albeit limited, within the Italian defense and foreign
policy community that would have Italy reassert itself
^From Ulrich Albrecht, "West Germany and Italy:
New Strategies," in Journal of International Affairs ,
Vol. 40, No.l, Summer 1986, 142.
11
on the world stage. This new generation of diplomats
and thinkers rejects traditional ideas about Italy's
role in the world and the future of her foreign
policy.^ Italians and their government are shedding the
vestiges of years of foreign policy complacency. The
foreign policy applications of arms transfers are
gradually being discovered. This awakening sense of
Italy's potential is a direct challenge to the
conventional wisdom on Italian motives in the arms
export business.
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The purpose of this project is to determine if, as
Albrecht notes, the prime motivation for Italian arms
exports is the economic factor. Additionally, the
research will examine other motives to ascertain




Italy, is moving away from the economic rationale
for arms exports to the use of arms transfers
^Many experts view Italian foreign policy as
little more than an extension of the American national
interest. For an alternative view, especially in the
wake of the Achille Lauro affair, see Joseph La





(including technology transfer) as a foreign policy
tool. This is due to an increased awareness of Italy's
potential in the Mediterranean, a new and developing
defense and foreign policy, and a desire for prestige.
C. METHODOLOGY
The first step in this research consists of an
examination of the Italian arms Industry and its
governmental controls. If the arguments for the
economic rationale are overriding, the origins must be
found in the arms industry and the way the industry
interacts with the government. Second, the rationales,
economic and political, will be examined to determine
their relative importance, especially in light of the
conditions of today's international system and the
increased Italian interest in international affairs.
The research leans heavily on data provided by the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) in their yearly publications, "World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers," as well as the
similar publications of the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The data's
reliability has been commented on by some of the most
distinguished scholars in the field and, therefore,
will not be repeated. A final, vital source is the
Italian Defense Ministry's White Papers of 1977 and
13
1985. The documents are unique in the history of Italy
and are rarely discussed outside the country. Although
the White Paper's are the government's most optimistic
estimation of its position, they are nevertheless
valuable for their insight into the policy apparatus.
Moreover, because of the secrecy the Italian government
practices in all matters related to defense, the White
Papers are the only available view of the defense
policy and process.
D. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES
The dependent variable being examined in this study
is the decision, by a government, to authorize the
transfer of weapons, materials, and training to another
government. The independent variables are those
elements that influence or have an impact on the
decision to transfer the armaments. The common term
describing these independent variables are rationales.
Generally, the rationales can be divided into three
categories: economic, political, and military. Figure
1.1 lists the most commonly accepted rationales for the
transfer of arms. The list is not meant to be all
inclusive, nor do all the rationales apply in the case
of Italy. The list is presented as an acknowledgement
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Figure 1.1 Rationales for Exporting Arms
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Of the three major categories, only two will be
examined in this study, the political and economic
rationales. Military rationales are excluded because of
the lack of evidence that they are at work in Italy's
case. Military motives are better suited to the great
powers--the United States, the Soviet Union, and, to a
lesser extent France and Great Britain.
Economic rationales are employed to assist a
country in its financial posture. Since the nation-
state is the level of analysis; one must consider the
macroeconomic picture as opposed to a microeconomic
view of one industrial sector. ^An economic rationale
persuades the decision making authority in the
government to approve an arms transfer for primarily
economic reasons.
The second major grouping of rationales is
political. A political rationale is defined as one in
which the benefits to be gained from the approval of a
sale are politically motivated. As Figure 1.1 shows,
the range of motives is great. The key to a political
rationale is the advantage, either perceived or real,
that the nation-state may gain from the transfer in the
international arena. Gains in the form of guarantees
^Although the nation-state is the intended level
of analysis, examination of the Italian defense
industry and its economic constraints requires an
analysis of a lower level.
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for access to oil and increases in international
stature are only two examples of this phenomenon.
Finally, a central element of the political rationale
is power, either through influence or recognition. This
is a study of the advantages to be gained from the use
of arms transfers as a political tool and will focus on




II . THE ITALIAN ARMS INDUSTRY AND ITS PROBLEMS
It is no secret that the Italians have developed a
competent defense industry. Since World War II, its
standing has fluctuated between fourth and sixth place
in the world. Figure 2.1 shows Italy's position
compared to the largest weapons producers. Unofficial
1986 estimates indicate Italy's market share has
remained the same.'*
Among the "Big Four" European weapons-producing
countries (France, Great Britain, West Germany, and
Italy) Italians hold a second place share in the
African market and a third place share in the Latin
American market. (See Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. ) Much
like the economic recovery of the nation, the Italian
arms industry astounded the world with its growth.
Following World War II, Italy, much like the rest
of Europe, needed to revitalize its economy. The
country suffered from the sting of moral humiliation
and faced financial disaster. This sting of moral
humiliation, a legacy of Italy's part in the Second
World War, would lead one to suspect that Italians
would be none too willing to resume producing the







































































































Figure 2.4 Middle East Market Share
22
maintain an adequate defense had already proven
prohibitive. From 1900 to 1910, the ratio of defense
expenditures to national income fluctuated between two
and three percent.^ During the First World War, that
percentage climbed to twenty-five percent. In the
second World War, the ratio of defense expenditures to
Gross National Product ( GNP ) exceeded twenty-five
percent. Such a drain on the economy and, for that
matter a drain on the people could have been none too
welcome in the recovery period.
When the Italian Peace Treaty was signed in 1947,
Italy was severely restricted in her military forces
and military industrial capacity. The treaty regulated,
for example, the size of the armed forces. Submarines
were prohibited, heavy armor was destroyed, and those
arms Italy required were provided from surplus US
stocks. Similarly, the Italian aircraft industry (both
the military and civilian sector) had been decimated.
From a total workforce of 40,000 during World War II,
there were only 4000 employed in 1948.^ In short,
there existed no arms industry.
However, the Cold War changed that situation, and
Italy, in accordance with the agreements of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO) began to
^ Libro Bianco-La Difesa, 1977 . 57-92.
^Ibid.
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reconstitute and reequip her armed forces. The 1950's
were tumultuous for the activity in all areas of the
economy, particulary because of the rebuilding of the
Italian defense industrial sector.
No stranger to defense industries, Italy's
entrepreneurs began to rebuild and re-tool with a
flourish.'^ In the spirit of capitalism, any and all who
desired to enter the industry did--there were no
controls established by the government. Since most of
the defense industry is government owned, this has led
to severe competition between elements of the State
holding companies. Not surprisingly, the inefficiency
stemming from this duplication of effort within the
companies has had its costs. The current Defense
Minister notes:
The national armaments industry, consisting of a
number of remarkably heterogenous firms, developed
in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's as a consequence
of entrepreneurial efforts to meet the increasing
foreign demand rather than within the framework of
a specific industrial development plan.°
Government and industry met in July, 1984 to
address this problem and attempt to streamline the
defense structure of Italy. The results are mixed but
'^See Robert Harkavy, The Arms Trade and
International Systems
, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing







d* Italia, 1985 . 74
.
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in recognizing the problem, the government has taken
that first, important step.^
A. THE PHASES OF INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT
The evolution of the Italian defense Industry can
be divided into four separate and distinct phases. ^^
(See Figure 2.5.) The initial period consisted of
Italian dependence on the United States for military
grants and comprised the earliest beginnings of a
domestic defense industry. During this period, the main
weapons systems produced were those designed by the
United States. Since Italy had retained some expertise
from the war years, however, she was soon able to begin
development of indigenously designed weapons. An
example is the FIAT G-91, a mainstay of European
attack aircraft during the 1960's and still in service,
albeit in reduced quantities in the Italian and German
Air Forces
.
*^See "Conferenza nazionale sull' industria per la
Difesa." Informazioni della Difesa , No. 7, July 1984,
2-13, for a complete report of the conference.
^'-'See Louscher and Salamone, Assessing the
Relationship between Technology Transfer and Security
Assistance provided by the United States, 1985, for an
alternative method of dividing the phases.
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Fighters F-86 F-104 Tornado AMX EFA
Trainers G-91 MB-326 MB-339 ? ?
SF-260
Helicopters H-47 AB-204 Sea King A-129 EH-101
AB-205 CH-47
Missiles — Sea Aspide Milan MAF?
Sparrow 0T0112
Armor M-47 M-60 Leopard OF40 ?
OT06616
OT06614
Artillery M-56 M-109 FH-70 Palmaria ?
Figure 2.5 The Evolution of Italian Arms Production
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B. PHASE TWO--LICEXSING
The second stage of Italian arms industry-
development began in the mid 1960's. Indicative of this
period are the licenses granted Italian firms to
produce equipment developed and designed outside of
Italy. This period is characterized by the developing
cooperation patterns between the United States and its
European allies. The most notable example of this new
cooperative pattern was the coproduction of F-104
aircraft. During this second phase the "wave of the
future" becomes evident in the Italian defense
industry. While most of the weapons produced during
this period were of a design that was not domestic, the
MB-326 trainer, an aircraft still in service today, was
designed, developed, and produced indigenously. A
charge, often leveled by detractors of the Italian
defense industry, holds that Italy only copies designs
and then markets them under a new name, thus
undermining the original manufacturers interest. Recent
criticism of this practice, certainly not unique to
Italy, wa§ reported in the New York Times :
The practice of linking foreign sales of military
hardware with technology transfers, trade favors,
and other contract prerequi s i tes ... hurts US
industry... Selenia Industria El letronica '
s
"Aspide" air-to-air missile, which was developed
with technology acquired from Raytheon as part of
27
an export contract, is now cutting into the sales
of Raytheon's "Sparrow" missile. ^-^
This "quest for technology" is a mainstay of all
Italian arms purchases, something now common to the new
"second tier" producers.
C. PHASE THREE--SELF-SUFFICIENCY
The next stage in Italian weapons Industry
development is marked by an increase in the number and
type of licenses acquired, as well as a definite trend
towards self-sufficiency in the industry. Two major
examples of this self-sufficiency are the development
and marketing of the MB-339 trainer, and the "Aspide"
air-to-air missile^ which have been sold to over
seventeen countries. This third stage, the mid-1970's,
also marks the point when the Italian arms export
business registers tremendous volume increases.
The high cost of technology, always a problem for a
country with an economy the size of Italy's, had
essentially slowed the prospects for an increased
Italian market share in the world markets by the
1970's.-^2 Well aware of the dangers inherent in falling




^^Although the Italian economy is healthy and
growing, the fact remains that it is not capable of
supporting a government's desires for high technology
research. Indeed, some argue the United States is
28
behind in the race for technology, but unwilling and
unable to fund the research effort on its own, the
Italian government entered into a number of co-
development projects during this period. Of particular
interest for its technological value, as well as the
political significance of "European" coproduct ion , is
the Tornado aircraft which was developed and produced
by Italy, Great Britain, and West Germany.
The most significant action during this perlod--
indeed , in the entire history of the industry--was the
promulgation of the Legge Promozional
i
, or
Modernization Laws, passed during the second half of
the 1970's. Touted as a means of modernizing the
Italian armed forces, a second, equally important aim
was to bolster the Italian defense industries . -^^ The
sudden increase in orders allowed the Italian industry
to flourish, and with few exceptions, exceed the long
term buying power of the Italian armed forces. It is,
in great measure, this overproduction that has placed
Italian armaments industries in the world position they
hold today.
asking too much in its pursuit of research for the
Strategic Defense Initiative.
^^Some experts believe that the Parliament was
also trying to quiet political stirrings of the armed
forces. While this may have been a secondary motive,
there is no evidence that the Parliament was overtly
trying to prevent such possibilities.
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D. PHASE FOUR- -TECHNOLOGY AXD THE FUTURE
The latest era in the maturation of the Italian
arms industry started in the early 1980's. The Italian
government reversed the role it was so long accustomed
to filling, namely that of recipient, and took the
major step of becoming a "big brother" supplier of
technology to other nations. With the AMX aircraft,
jointly developed and produced with Brazil, Italy was
able to exercise a dominant role in the technology
transfer process. Offsets and technology transfer are
generally seen as a necessary evil in the weapons
trade, something that must be done to "close the deal".
The ability to transfer technology is, however, an
expression or indication of a country's standing in the
industrial world.
By continuing practices honed during the previous
decade, the Italian firm, OTO-iMelara, introduced the
first tank des igned and produced indigenously in Italy
since the end of the War. The arms industry and the
government appear to be pursuing the co-production
route for all those items requiring high technology.
This co-production can assume one of two forms, the
traditional subordinate relationship Italy has had for
so long, or the newer, superior relationship cultivated
with Brazil. Both arrangements have advantages.
30
E. PROBLEMS FOR THE INDUSTRY AXD GOVERNMENT
A fundamental tenet of Italian defense policy is
the maintenance of an adequate defense industry. This
is a relatively new phenomenon closely linked to an
articulation of a new defense industrial policy. The
government has passed laws and established cabinet
level offices to oversee the industry, as well as to
Insure its viability. The commitment is reflected in
this quote from the 1985 White Paper discussing the
state of the industry:
...This technological evolution draws necessarily
attention to the relations between defence and
industry. A strong, diversified and vital defence
industry is more and more indi spensable--agains
t
all demonizat ions and simplifications of the past--
to keep national independence in an era in which
the technological development of weapons systems
produces very rapid shifts and imbalances in the
military ratios among the various countries. Italy
can not become the hostage of decisions made within
the military and industrial systems of other
countr les . -'-^
Addressing the posture of the industry. Minister
Spadolini makes a clear connection between the defense
policy of the Republic of Italy and its armaments
industry
.
...to play an effective role within the Atlantic
Alliance, which is our firm reference point, we
must have an efficient national defense industry--
an industry that, depending on economies of scale
like all other industries, must necessarily have a
marked presence in foreign markets; this presence,
^"^ Libro Bianco , p.xlv. This quote is a portion of
the introduction to the White Book written by the
Minister of Defense, Giovanni Spadolini.
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however, is to become more and more transparent as
a result of precise regulations on weapons
market ing . -' ^
The Italian government, long criticized by the
industry as insensitive and incompetent in their
regard, is taking bold and positive steps to bolster
the armaments sector. The 1985 Italian Defense White
Paper discusses the steps the government has taken,
generally keyed to the massive procurement program
underway in the country. Spadolini comments on the
government's concept of a role for the industry:
...between the two equally dangerous options of
autarky and of an indiscriminate expansion in Third
World countries, the Italian industry can play a
much more constructive role. . . .-'°
F. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ITALIAN ARMS INDUSTRY
The structure of the industry is depicted in Figure
2.6. The Italian government, through its two major
holding companies, Ente d i Par t i cpazione e
Finanz iamento Industria Manufattura (EFIM) and I st i tuto
per la Ri costruzione Industriale (IRI) control
approximately 1Q% of the industry. The third major
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Figure 2.6 Italian Arms Industry Structure
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A major portion of the 1985 Italian Defense White
Paper is devoted to a discussion of the problems faced
by the defense industry today. The greatest problem is
the lack of any coherent division of labor. For
instance, nine separate shipbuilding concerns compete
not only on the world market, but also In the much
smaller Italian market. Through the Ministry of State
Participation, the government has attempted to
streamline the entire industry with only limited
success. The entrenched bureaucracy of the state-owned
companies has become expert at turning away threats to
their existence. Moreover, the bureaucracies of these
companies have succeeded in enlisting the support of a
number of the smaller political parties in the Italian
political system, affording the companies the cl ientela




If the government owns the industry, it follows
that control of sales and transfers should be made
easier. This does not appear to be the case. The
industries are relatively autonomous in their actions
and by some reports have established effective lobbies
^^ Cl ientel a refers to the system of favors, an
"I'll scratch your back, you scratch mine" system that
is prevalent in all aspects of Italian politics.
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to further their sales. ^^ Italian firms also regularly
develop weapons for export, sometimes working on the
specifications provided by a foreign government.
However, Italian firms that develop weapons for export




Italian armaments production has progressed from an
initial, rudimentary defense establishment to an
Industrial sector capable of rivaling those of the most
advanced countries. With few exceptions, the Italian
industry is capable of producing the most advanced
weapons available, and in some cases, Is the sole
supplier of technology and armaments to the United
States and elsewhere.-'-^ As the industry and the nation
proceed into the future, technology will be at once the
key to the future as well as one of Italy's greatest
dilemmas. It is the greatest dilemma because of the
tremendous costs associated with research and
^^See Sandro Acciari and Pietro Calderoni, "Porto
d'Armi," L'Espresso , 23 November 1986, 9.
^^The United States Navy recently purchased the
OTO-Melara ship turrets, generally recognized as the
best in the world. The United States Army also
contracted with the Beretta Company of Italy for the
procurement of handguns for the entire U.S. military.
That contract has been challenged by the Congress and
U.S. handgun producers.
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development. Italy has regularly cut research and
development monies in an effort to control the budget.
Technology is also the key because of the possibilities
it offers Italian policy makers as a foreign policy
tool, especially with those countries of the Third
World.
Italian defense industries have long prospered and
existed with only the most minimal attention afforded
by the government. This lack of government interest has
been reversed at the request of industries that find
themselves competing with each other for an ever
smaller market. As the government turns its attention
to the armaments industry, there will be more and more
consolidation of effort to reduce duplication. An
important side-effect, from the governmental
standpoint, is the almost certain increase in control
that will accompany the streamlining process.
It is this control, the "power of the purse," that
will allow the Italian government to exercise
increasing levels of supervision over this important
Industrial sector. This same control will permit the
Italian government to use the policy tool of arms
transfers to its utmost efficiency.
36
Ill . ARMS TRANSFER MECHANISMS
The approval procedures for arms transfers are
depicted in Figure 3.1. All arms exports with the
exception of small pistols and certain hunting weapons
require an arms export license in accordance with the
Decreto Ministeriale (Ministerial Decree) of 1939
modified by the decrees of 1975 and 1984. The process
consists of three stages:
1. The firm wishing to export weapons first requests
authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
This authorization is similar to that required by
the United States government.
2. The Ministry of Foreign Trade submits the request
to the Intermini s ter ial committee. Indications are
that the Foreign and Defense Ministers possess an
absolute veto over any sales. The Prime Minister
has final authority, although in practice, the
decision seldom goes to that office. The National
Armaments Director, a subordinate of the Defense
Minister charged with the control of technology
transfer and internal force readiness, regularly
examines the request. Additionally, as shown in


























Figure 3.1 Licensing Flowchart
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Director of Military Intelligence (SISMI) are
requested to comment.
3. The final step in the procedure is the issuance of
the export license by the Ministry of Finance.
More and more companies have started to bypass the
Foreign Trade Ministry and to present their case
directly to the Foreign Ministry. This developing
pattern can be explained by postulating that the
Foreign Ministry is the key player in the approval
process. If the Foreign Minister is the key player,
this marks a consolidation of power, as well as a
conscious effort to apply foreign policy criteria to
the approval process.
A former chairman of the Italian Parliamentary
Defense Committee, the retired naval captain Falco
Accame, has been one of the most outspoken critics of
government procedures for granting permission to export
and is credited with the reforms that have recently
been enacted. Accame began expressing concern over the
"indiscriminate sale of Italian arms to other
countr ies . "^^ His concerns were over the lack of
parliamentary control in arms procurement and arms
sales. Interviews with Accame stress his belief that
pressures from arms manufacturers were driving the
20From "Italian Arms Trade Rides Out Economic
Storm", The Middle East , November 1982, 23-26.
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modernization plans of the Italian military into a
"more is better" frame of mind.^^ His solution,
supported by a great number of the deputies, especially
those on the left and in the opposition, consisted of
parliamentary control similar, as he noted, to the
control exercised by the other major powers.
Prior to the 1977 White Paper there was generally
uncritical examination of the technical and budgetary
aspects of Italian security policy. The laws passed in
1975 and 1977 to upgrade the armed services, which were
essentially supplementary budget authorizations, were
apportioned on the basis of size of service rather than
well-defined and debated policy considerations. These
laws allowed the military and civilian leaders of the
defense establishment to procure virtually anything
desired, without a requirement to justify decisions to
a parliamentary committee. ^^ Procurement activities and
arms transfer authorizations have only recently come
under the scrutiny of the Italian parliament.
2lAntonio Pelliccia, "The View from Italy", NATO '
s
Fifteen Nations
. August-September 1978, 91.
^^The aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi , is an
example of the freedom of action permitted the
services. Until recently, the navy was not authorized
fixed-wing aircraft because of laws that established
the air force. Faced with the "fait accompli",
parliament recently authorized the Navy to purchase and
fly fixed-wing aircraft.
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Recent steps taken to increase control of the
weapons transfer process include the establishment of
an office similar to that of the United States Office
of Munitions Control and the creation of an exporters
list. According to the Defense Minister, the exporters
list is required, "...to guarantee a clear and fair
behavior on the part of specialized operators (namely
their professional and entrepreneurial reliability,
their observance of penal and anti-mafia laws and the
legislation relevant to secret assoc iat ions ) . "^^ Also,
all weapons have been classified by category and
included in an armaments list.
The 1977 White Paper is a landmark because the
Italian government (apart from the actual management
control exercised through state-owned entitles) finally
established a policy for the defense industrial sector.
That policy has further matured and developed in the
1985 White Paper.
Analysts frequently note that Italian defense
industry has been "running out of control," that is,
the government exercises little regulation. The 1977
paper marked the first attempts by the government to
gain control of an otherwise "free market" industry.
Faced with a forceful government policy for the first
time, armament manufacturers have reacted. The main
^^ Libro Blanco 1985 , 80
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argument used by both the private and public companies
notes that the armaments industry is a valuable
instrument that improves the national welfare, but an
instrument that would suffer under parliamentary
control. The industries further argue that since the
parliament had not seen fit to provide a sufficiently
large research and development budget to support
national arms procurement programs (a requirement for
the industries to stay competitive even in Italy) that
"...it is necessary to surmount ethical and political
obstacles hampering the export of arms to less
industrialized countries. ^^
In summary , the debate over the new governmental
controls and enforcement is by no means settled. Difesa
Oggi , an Italian defense trade magazine, regularly
sponsors papers by industry experts on the state of the
industry and the effects of government regulations.^^
In examining the titles of topics for discussion, an
observer would conclude that the industry is
disconcerted with the turn the government has taken.
Italian industry regularly complains about bureaucratic
^"^See Antonio Pelliccia, op. cit.
^^L ' Internazionale Defence Forum di Difesa Oggi
,
regularly sponsors seminars on the defense industry.
One example of a recent paper was: The Italian
Aerospace Industry Contesting the Politics that Control




procedures required by its government, but the
appearance of argumentative papers on the government's
export policy is indicative of the trend towards new
control .
It is unjust to say that the Italian experience
prior to 1977 was similar to that of the "merchants of
death" era, but the generalization would not be far
fetched. The laws requiring government approval for
arms transfers were passed almost fifty years ago, but,
as is often pointed out, they have not been effective.
In The Arms Trade with the Third World
,
published in
1971, SIPRI researchers noted:
The role of any government in the export of
weapons is generally twofold: to promote and to
restrict the flow of weapons. The Italian
government does not play an active role in
either of these directions.^"
Cannizzo, describes the "Merchants of Death" period
as one in which the principal characters of the day
were unashamed to "... give arms to all men who offer
an honest price for them, without respect of persons
and principles . "^'^ Pragmatically, such a description
is accurate of the Italian arms trade, at least before
1977. While government approval was required for
2^SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World , New
York: Humanities Press, 1971, 274.
_
^'^Cindy Cannizzo, "Trends in Twentieth-Century




export, more often than not, this was a mere formality.
The latest trends, notwithstanding critics such as
Albrecht, suggest that the emphasis is on control. It
was only in 1977, many years after the other major
producers, that the line was finally being drawn, and
the Italian government was at last attempting to assert
control over the weapons industry.
Some of the most convincing evidence for increased
political controls is being demonstrated by the arms
manufacturers themselves. Although not prevalent enough
to be called a trend, there are signs that the industry
representatives, recognizing the political emphasis on
arms sales, are going directly to the source, the
Foreign Ministry, rather than using established
channels to gain approval for export.
Finally, the antagonisms between the government and
industry are sure to continue. Italians are fond of
saying that a result of their history is the inability
of any government to rule the country. The White Paper
shows that the government has a "design" for the
Industry and is not willing to permit the industry to
regain the upper hand. This is the eternal fight--the
confrontation between politics and economics--
recognizable in most weapons exporting countries. The
evidence which surfaced during this discussion on the
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arms transfer mechanisms seems to indicate that the
politicians are winning.
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC FACTORS IN ITALIAN ARMS
TRANSFERS
Most Western European nations, as well as the newer
"second-tier" producers of arms, recognize that exports
are vital to the maintenance of a domestic defense
industry. Logic dictates that the size of the industry
must be sufficient to produce the requested weapons for
the domestic market, but that the domestic market is
not large enough to totally support the Industry. The
Republic of Italy is no different. The key issue is the
extent to which the economic factor drives weapons
exports and influences governments to forsake moral
considerations in exporting arms to areas or nations
that would otherwise be censured.
A review of the literature indicates two schools of
thought on the economic rationale as a motivator for
arms sales. The two schools essentially disagree over
the impact that economic factors have on the export
Industry. The Andrew Pierre school dismisses the
economic primacy of arms sales as a major rationale:
It may be, however, that the economic importance of
arms sales--the "explanation" most often given for
their existence and expans ion--i s not so great as
often believed to be. The widespread perception
that high levels of arms sales are necessary for
the national economies of the principal suppliers
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is based upon vague, general notions rather than
hard data . ^S
On the other hand, Ulrich Albrecht argues that the
sole reason nations export (especially nations the size
of West Germany and Italy) is for the economic benefit:
The new commercialism in the area of arms exports
can be explained, especially in the case of
Italy, ...by a shift in export policy decision-
making from government to industry. Foreign policy
considerations are losing their importance. In a
dispute over a potential weapons sale, it is
increasingly likely that economic motives will
prevail over diplomacy. ^^
Throughout his article Albrecht emphasizes the
economic rationale for Italian arms sales at the
expense of any foreign policy aims. Economics certainly
play a part in all arms transfers-- including those of
the superpowers. It is not clear whether in the case of
Italy, economics is the sole or even the most important
motivator for arms exports.
If the foreign policy rationale for arms exports
has been subordinated to economics, there are two
possible explanations for such a result. Either the
government has relinquished control to the industry as
Albrecht theorizes, or it is ineffective in its efforts
to assert authority. Neither explanation applies in
Italy's regard.
^^Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms
Sales , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, 25.
29Albrecht, 142
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The Italian White Book-19S5 states the official
Italian policy on the economic issue:
. . .
in order to achieve the economies of scale
necessary for a balanced productive structure which
can only partially rely on an inevitably limited
internal demand, the industry must be able to
export a substantial part of the armaments of
national production (although within the strategic
and political choices for achieving cooperation and
strengthening internal security). ^^
Critics of Italian policy note that the government
has proven itself incapable of controlling to any large
extent the arms trade; therefore, policy pronouncements
are meaningless. This section examines possible
benefits the Italian government derives from the export
of arms to determine if in fact the economic factor is
the dominant one.
A. ARMS TRANSFERS AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Figure 4.1 shows the fluctuations of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) from 1975 to 1984. Noteworthy is the
period 1979-1982 when Italy slipped into the worst
recession it has seen since the end of the War.^-'-
Figure 4.2 depicts the production of the armaments





















Figure 4.1 Gross Domestic Product
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Figure 4.2 Arms Transfers 1967-1983
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industry was essential to the economy, then the
measurement of GDP should reflect a strong positive
relationship. That is, as arms production and sales
increase, the measurement of gross domestic product
should also increase. Clearly this is not the case.
While the average percent change in GDP fell during the
period from 1979 to 1983, the arms exports figures
actually rose during two of those years.
An aggregate regression analysis of the World
Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) data
suggests that arms exports and gross national product
are correlated up to the start of the Italian recession
in 1979. That correlation, however, falls off
drastically in 1980-1984; the adjusted r-squared value
is -0.457, indicating a negative relationship . ^^ Figure
4.3 shows the scatterplot obtained from the analysis.
Obviously the data available are not sufficient to
predict a trend. However, it appears as though a shift
has occurred.
There are a number of plausible explanations for
the correlation in the 1970's, the most logical being
the "arms-for-oi 1 " question. The reversing of this
trend can be explained by the oil market "glut" or,
'^^The regression analyses were performed as part
of a graduate level methodology course at the Naval
Postgraduate School. All results are unpublished
papers. The results are available from the author.
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more likely, a conscious increase in the control of the
sales of weapons abroad by the Italian government.
It is also conceivable that Italian government
economists tracking the fall in GDP would have
recommended a liberalization in arms transfer policy to
aid in economic recovery, but the size of the industry
Is insufficient to have made any real change. Moreover,
the international arms market is relatively inelastic.
An easing of restrictions would not necessarily
generate improvement in the economy because the demand
for arms in peacetime is generally steady with few
highs and lows. For instance, even the reverse in the
economic fortunes of the Mid East oil exporters has not
caused sharp changes in the world-wide demand for
weapons. From this analysis we can draw the conclusion
that an argument citing the al 1 - Important benefits of
arms transfers on the national economy is not valid.
B. THE SIZE OF THE INDUSTRY
A more thorough examination of the economy is
enlightening. An investigation of the industrial sector
shows that, among those depicted, only the minerals
Industry is smaller than the armaments Industry. (See
Figure 4.4. ) Mondo Economlco, a widely respected
Italian trade newspaper, reports that the armaments and







































Figure 4.4 Manufactured Goods by Sector
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industrial sector. In 1984, that 3.7 percent share was
equal to approximately forty-two billion Italian Lire
or three billion dollars. That three billion dollars is
equal to some four percent of the gross national
product. The figure is certainly significant, but
hardly a key determinant in the context of the entire
economy
.
If the government was purely economically motivated
or if the "decision-making authority had shifted from
government to industry," then one could expect an
emphasis on armaments trade similar to the French
example where military attaches are salesmen first and
military professionals second. ^^ This does not appear
to be the case in Italy. In fact, the government has
been singularly unsuccessful in attempts to streamline
the armaments sector. The Financial Times Survey of the
Italian Defence Industry asserts that as long as the
major groups, IRI and EFIM are controlled by the
Christian Democratic party and Socialist party
respectively, streamlining the sector is politically
impossible. A government keen on profits for industry
would take steps to prevent such needless duplication
of effort and waste of limited research and development





monies. '^'^ Conversely, as already described, an
industry bent on exporting would not be adverse to a
rational division of labor, freeing resources for
better applications, including new products.
C. EMPLOYMENT AND UNIONS
The defense industry employs some 80,000 persons
out of a possible 22,804,000, employed in the country,
equivalent to less than one-half of one percent (.35^)
of the Italian workforce. ^^ Since the government,
through its holding companies (IRI and EFIM) controls
approximately 70^ of the industry, there is an obvious
vested political interest in maintaining the Jobs. It
is, however, difficult to imagine a government at the
mercy of such a small portion of the populace, even
when that government is known for the favors it
dispenses . ^^
The unemployment level for 1986 is approximately
10. 7"^. Any drastic change in unemployment figures,
given the high rate would be political suicide,
something Italian politicians are unwilling to do.
Albrecht discusses the power organized labor is
^'^James Buxton, "The Italian Defence Industry,"
Financial Times
,
28 July 1986, 10-11.
^^Source: OECD Economic Outlook, 1985. Paris: OECD




attempting to bring to bear in the industr ies . ^"^ Xot
surprisingly, the workers are concerned for their Jobs.
In their quest for legitimacy in their work, as well as
the maintenance of their jobs, workers are turning to
the unions for assistance.
A new development is the non-partisan aspect of
these unions. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) has
until recently been the protector of the defense
Industries unions. It was also until recently the only
political party that had attempted to focus
systematically on the military and industry
relationship."^^
It may be coincidental, but the PCI has been losing
influence, and the present five party coalition has, to
date, outlasted any other post-war government in Italy.
The unions are attempting to diversify their political
support in an attempt to guarantee the future of their
Jobs. It is, however, unclear how much political power
these particular unions will be able to wield,
especially in light of the decline in union prestige
37 Ibid
^^See Ciro Zoppo , The Defense and Military
Policies of the Italian Communist Party , Santa Monica:
Rand Corporation, 1977.
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after the FIAT incident in 1984 and the revision of the
scala mobile . ^^
During the FIAT incident, a group of workers
deliberately crossing strike lines led to the near
devastation of at least one union. The scala mobile
referendum similarly emphasized the waning sympathies
unions have received in the country, and it lessened
their ability to mobilize support. In staking their
reputations on the referendum, the major unions were
severely damaged by losing. The results of that
referendum must be considered in any analysis of the
future of the Italian union movement and its possible
effectiveness in the political arena, especially in an
area as sensitive as arms transfers.
D. SUMMARY
An essential element of the economics rationale
requires the government to passively allow foreign and
security policy concerns to become subordinated to
economi cs--the eternal quest for scarce resources. That
quest foi; resources, in Italy's case at least, is
driven by, rather than inferior to, the country's
national interest.
^^A wage-inflation index enacted to protect the
union members during the era of 25^ inflation in the
Italy of the mid-1970's. The measure was repealed by a
1984 referendum initiated by the Craxi government.
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The arguments Ulrich Albrecht uses to prove the
direction Italian arms transfer policy is taking--
namely economic--are not convincing. Albrecht ' s central
arguments concentrate on the unions and technology
transfer, but those same two themes are sources of
proof for the counter argument.
The Italian unions are facing an era of reduced
importance. For this reason, the unions' ability to
act as the politico-economic force driving arms
production and by extension, the arms transfer approval
process is not only diminished, but non-existent.
The second element of Albrechts' argument is the
effect of technology transfer on exports. He argues
that Italy is using technology transfer to further her
economic fortunes. No one can argue that Italy has been
heavily engaged in technology transfer. However, as
will be demonstrated later, the prime reason Italy
transfers technology is not for the economic benefits,
but rather the influence and prestige available from
doing so.
Two other traditional arguments, the contribution
to GDP and the Industry Share, that could support the
economic rationale are also inappropriate in the case
of the Italian Republic. Cursory analysis reveals that
there is no correlation between gross domestic product
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and arms exports. In fact, the negative correlation
produced from the analysis could suggest that as arms
transfers increase, gross domestic product decreases. A
government faced with a choice between increasing arms
transfers, a very small part of the Italian Industrial
sector, and decreasing GDP, is unlikely to encourage
many arms sales as an economic move.
In Italy there are so many conflicting motives for
arms exports and sales that it is folly to say that any
one rationale is the basis. Economics certainly are
important, especially as Italy rebuilds and reequips
her armed forces. But, to conclude that the economic
question is the first and last point in the decision-
making process is clearly unjustified by the data
introduced to this point.
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V. EVOLVING DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY
An important element of the political rationale for
arms transfers can be found in the foreign and defense
policy of the nation being examined. For instance, the
American weapons sales to Iran in the 1970's, followed
the American policy of trying to strengthen the Shah of
Iran, thereby reducing the risk of war in that volatile
area. Similarly, the sales of United States weapons to
Israel demonstrates the American commitment to that
country
.
Although Italian defense policy is, relatively
speaking, a new phenomenon, it is fundamental to the
examination of the political rationale. Italy's new
interest in defense matters is not limited to the NATO
connection nor to the military. Instead, it is
representative of an awakening of the Italian political
conscience regarding all things associated with defense
including the Italian armaments industries. A study of
the policy development shows three distinct stages of
evolution. The first is marked by the realization that
Italy is susceptible to threats other than those posed
by the Warsaw Pact. The second stage is the reaction to
the first ever White Paper published in 1977, and the
third, originating with the 1985 White Paper, is only
61
beginning to develop. This section will examine each of
these stages and analyze their impact on the weapons
industry, on the newly realized role Italy has to play
in the world, and on the developing political
rationales behind arms transfers.
A. ITALY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN PERSPECTIVE
Geographically and historically, Italy sees itself
as the link between the European continent and the
Mediterranean and Middle East. The importance of this
geography, history, and to a large extent, sociology is
important to Italian leaders. Of the "modern" European
nations of the Mediterranean, Italy's economy is more
than twice the size of Spain's and ten to fifteen times
larger than Greece, Portugal, and Turkey. As a result
of the skills and diplomatic talents of her immediate
post-war leaders, Italy is also one of the founding
members of The European Community and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Italian democracy has
lasted through what many call precarious times and has
of late experienced unprecedented stability. Although
Italy is only now coming into her own on the
international
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scene, she is and has been the greatest power in the
Mediterranean for some tlme.'^O Both foreign and
defense policy are influenced by these factors.
Italian defense policy builds on the tenets of the
foreign policy by taking the concepts of the political
authorities and refining them in terms of national
security. The stated Italian defense policy consists of
four basic points:
1. The refusal to use military force as a threat.
2. Adhesion to the NATO alliance.
3. The promoting of Europe as an integrated,
cohesive political entity, eventually capable of
sel f-defense
.
4. The Mediterranean and littoral, and its security
and importance for the Italian State.
B. ITALY'S NEW INTEREST IN DEFENSE POLICY
Prior to the 1977 White Paper, the Italian
government (as well as the populace) had generally
ignored defense issues. A simple fact of Italian
political, life is that domestic politics take
precedence over all else. As long as foreign and
defense policy remained unobtrusive, the attention of
"^^Although France borders on the Mediterranean,
her outlook tends more to Central Europe. Italy, on the
other hand, has always concentrated on the
Mediterranean and littoral.
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the populace remained in the provinces and maybe every
so often turned to Rome. The Italian attitude towards
defense matters is reflected in its adherence to the
NATO alliance and its acquiesence in all things within
that forum.
The United States is hard pressed to find a more
loyal supporter of American policies than Italy. In
1970, for instance, a former Defense Minister remarked,
"NATO is Italy's cheapest and most effective form of
defense."^-'- Indeed, the NATO option allowed Italy to
concentrate on rebuilding the economy, defense
industries included, while not draining precious
resources. Italian armed forces paid the price for such
an attitude, while the defense industries were allowed
virtual autonomy in the expansion.
The impetus for a new defense policy came as early
as November of 1972, when Admiral Eugenic Henke, the
first naval officer appointed to the office of Chief of
the Defense Staff (equivalent to the US Chairman of the
"^^From Walter Galling. "Swords into Plowshares?
Not in Italy," The Daily American , 19-20 April 1970.
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JCS) announced publicly that Italy "...Intended to
carry out a defence policy autonomous with respect to
threats that we cannot expect will induce immediate
support from Allied countr ies . "^^ This pronouncement,
reflecting a new awareness of Italy's potential
problems as well as her potential abilities, was
followed by Parliament's approval of a ten-year
modernization program.
In 1977, the first White Paper, La Pi
f
esa--Libro
Bianco 1977 , was published. The White Paper addressed
the major issues that were politically significant at
the time. In response to the deepening recession of the
late '70's the major issue centered on how the armed
forces would operate in light of the necessity for
budgetary cuts.'^^ The laws passed in the mid-1970's,
those laws authorizing the modernization of Italian
military forces, as well as the promotion of various
industrial sectors of the defense industry, had been
^^As reported in Antonio de Marchi. "Italian
Defence in the 1980's," Jane's Defence Review , Vol.2,
No. 4, 1981, 259-260.
^'^The original thrust of the budget cuts was to be
reductions in the size of the Army. A December 1977
NATO press release expressed disquiet at the
reductions. Shortly thereafter, all talk of reductions
in strength were clarified by the Italian government as




proposed and passed without debate. '^'^ This time,
Parliament desired to make its voice heard.
The military had greatly benefitted from the new
interest in defense generated by the Legge
Promoz i onal
i
. In a similar manner, though not for the
same reasons, the defense Industries had also profited.
In addressing the budgetary issue, the 1977 White Paper
emphasized the necessity to control the modernization
process, while controlling and contributing to the
defense industrial sector which "forms the [Italian]
second line of defense in the international context. "'^^
There is no question that the Defense Ministry and the
Services recognized the need for, and importance of,
the defense industries. It is at this point In time,
the mid-1970's, that the concept of defense policy as
the watchdog over the defense industry was born. The
best example of the need to watch over the weapons
industries is the establishment of the Office of
National Armaments Director as a separate agency
reporting directly to the Minister of Defense.
'^'^The decision to modernize rested on two major
assumptions. The first recognized the need to assist
the defense industry or accept its demise. The second
was a sincere attempt to contribute materially to the







C. DEFEXSE POLICY IX ACTIOX
Three major events, firsts in the history of modern
Italy, mark the second stage in the development of
Italy's defense policy. First was the decision by the
government to accept cruise missiles on Italian soil.
The second was Italy's participation in the
peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. The Italian guarantee
of neutrality to the island nation of Malta, a
guarantee backed by military force was the third
component in Italy's second stage of evolution.
According to retired Italian Army Brigadier General
Lulgi Caligaris, the renewed interest in defense
matters was spurred by the 1979 decision to accept
Cruise missiles. "^^ This decision is the watershed of
the evolution of Italian defense and foreign policy in
the NATO arena. For the first time, Italy was in the
same league as West Germany and the other Central Front
alliance members in that nuclear weapons with a
strategic capability would be deployed. The decision
spurred discussion that even today affects the public
perceptions of defense. This decision is important for
a number of reasons, but most important for the fact
that it accentuated defense in the public eye so soon




Caligaris, "Italian Defense Policy:
Prospects," Survival , March-April 1983,
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of mind" is especially germane in the Italian case of
defense
.
It is also important to remember the "fears" that
were being voiced in the various western capitals over
the very real danger of the Italian Communist party
coming to power in the 1979 elections. The Italian
"reconfirmation" of western ties, by recognizing the
necessity of taking a stand, allowed other populations
in Europe to accept the missiles. The Italian desire to
expand in international affairs--to accept the role of
great power--can be traced to the missile decision and
is the most important step in the evolution of Italian
defense policy.
Italy's contribution to the peacekeeping forces in
the troubled area of Lebanon--to this day a source of
national pride--is the second major event in the
Italian defense maturation. For the first time Italian
forces were sent overseas to assist in a mission that
for Italy, more than any other nation participating,
had personal meaning, i.e. keeping peace in the Eastern
Mediterranean. To Indicate the importance attached to
the mission and its impact on military planning, the
authors of the 1985 White Paper note:
The mission in Lebanon provided an Important test
of a whole set of principles which are the
cornerstone of our national defence concept. ...(It
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also) confirms the need of setting up ore-
established joint "ready deployment" units.... '^'
These two actions served to further public
interest in defense when, according to past experience,
It would have flagged. The continuing emphasis on the
military allowed the Services to continue their
modernization plans. It was also during this period
that for the first time since World War II, the Italian
government undertook to guarantee the sovereignty and
neutrality of another country, Malta.
D. ITALY AS PROTECTOR
The decision to support Malta arose from a
multitude of factors that is the natural consequence of
the tensions in the Mediterranean over the last ten
years. As already noted, Italy stands at the crossroads
between north and south. The Mediterranean separates
those more modern, industrialized countries of Europe
from the traditional, although generally wealthy,
nations of the Middle East. All Mediterranean countries
are increasing their military power through the
purchase of arms, either to protect themselves from
encroachments or to bring pressure on neighboring
countries
.
^'^ Libro B i anco- 1 '^85 , Annex, 168
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It is this context in which Italy finds herself
deeply involved. A partial reason for the Italian
decision to assist Malta comes from a 1980 Libyan
demand that Malta cease oil exploration in disputed
waters. That demand was reinforced by the appearance of
a Libyan submarine close to the Maltese drilling
platform. One isolated instance of aggression is not
necessarily a reason any power chooses to defend
another. The implication, however, consistent with the
new defense policy, is that Italy is acting to protect
her own vital interests in the Mediterranean, and that
the concept is moving from rhetoric to reality.
The decision is significant for what it suggests
for the future directions of Italian foreign and
defense policy. ^^
If the Malta decision is examined instead in the
context of the developing defense policy, the reasons
'^^See, for instance Caligaris, noted above, and
Stefano Silvestri, "The Italian Paradox: Consensus amid
stability," in Gregory Flynn, ed. The Internal Fabric
of Western Security , London: Allanheld, Osmun and Co.,
1981.
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for this guarantee, do offer major advantages for
Italy. For example, since the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869, the eastern Mediterranean has been the major
line of communication between the Atlantic, Indian, and
Pacific Oceans. Equally important, the Canal also
offered Italy the opportunity of new markets for the
finished products the Italians have exported for years
to the Middle East. The Mediterranean also is the
conduit for the raw materials, including energy
supplies, that Italy needs to survive. In this light,
the 1973 statement by the Chief of the Defense Staff
referring to the necessity for Italian autonomy in the
Mediterranean, and the decision to back Malta with the
"military might" of Italy, is only natural.
E. THE THREATS TO ITALIAN SECURITY
The 1985 White Paper acknowledges that while the
Soviet Union remains the greatest threat to Italian and
NATO southern flank security, there is emerging a newer
threat. From the Italian point of view, the Middle East
is the most likely region for superpower confrontation.
Implicit in that recognition is the role Italy must
play although not required to do so by the NATO treaty.
The threat is shifting from the traditional
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northeastern sector, long central to Italian military
planners, to the north-south axis.
Significantly the White Paper only addresses the
Soviet forces. This omission, whether intentional or
not, is addressed in the January-February 1987 edition
of Ri vista Militare , in an article by a senior Army
officer. The article's emphasis is on the military
forces of the countries of the Mediterranean not Judged
to be friendly to the interests of Italy. The list
includes Yugoslavia for its ideological ties to the
USSR, but is otherwise devoted exclusively to Middle
Eastern countries considered threats to Italian
security. The list encompasses Algeria, Iraq, Libya,
Syria, and Tunisia. The author concludes that because
of the economic and political factors inherent in her
position both geographically and within the alliance,
Italy has assumed, "a role (in the Mediterranean) of
primary strategic impor tance . " '^ "^
F. FOREIGN POLICY AND ARMS TRANSFERS
Italian foreign policy, much like its defense
policy, depends on the domestic concerns of the
government in power. Those domestic concerns throughout
the 1970's overshadowed the conduct of foreign policy
^^From Luigi Salatiello, "II Problema Operativo
Italiano," in Ri vista Militare
,
(Rome: Italian Ministry
of Defense) January-February 1987, 28-44.
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to the exclusion of any other concern. The country was
faced with the choice between the ineffective (up to
that point) Christian Democratic party, and the
unproven and perhaps dangerous Italian Communist Party.
The official position on Italian foreign policy was
approved by the Chamber of Deputies (Italy's lower
house) on October 19, 1977, and by the Senate on
December 1, 1977. These declarations emphasize five
major initiatives that, according to the decrees, are
to form the centerpiece of Italian foreign policy for
the foreseeable future. The five major Initiatives are:
l)...to participate actively in the process of
European integration, working for a widening of the
Community, and supporting the (creation) of more
democratic and more valid institutions starting
from the European Parliament and from the adoption
(of) a new type of structural and programming
policy. . . .
2)... to participate along with the allies [XATO]
in all the initiatives taken in Vienna, Geneva,
Belgrade and the UX Special Assembly to promote
detente, to slow down the nuclear and conventional
armaments race and to bring about the application
of the Helsinki agreement, ...while safeguarding
national security.
3 ) . . . to contr Ibute-- in the observance of the right
of self -determination-- to eliminate through
negotiations the hotbeds of war in Af r 1 ca , . . . and to
eliminate, in Southern Africa, segregative regimes
and all forms of apartheid...
4 ) . . . to encourage European initiatives aimed at
overcoming the serious Xorth-South imbalance, and
...to broaden East-West relations within the
framework of the EEC and COMECON. . .
.
5)... to commit itself to constantly support in the
Middle East all current efforts aimed at convening
the Geneva Conference for a just peace as soon as
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possible .... (The Senate) hopes (further) that the
government's action for problems concerning the
Mediterranean will contribute to their
solution. . . .-'^
A comparison of Italian foreign and defense
policies demonstrates a consistency not always apparent
in other western countries. The emphasis on the Middle
East and Mediterranean, already noted in discussing
defense policy, is a recurring theme throughout Italian
diplomatic history.
The events of the early 1980's recession and
recovery, deployment of the INF, and the Malta
guarantee marked the beginning of a new era in Italian
foreign policy. Perhaps even more important was the
election and surprising durability of the five party
government under Craxi, the first Socialist Prime
Minister the country had seen. Elected in 1983, Bettino
Craxi has served longer than any other Italian Prime
Minister with the exception of Mussolini.^-'- The
stability provided by this five party government, and
the fact that for the first time the Defense and
Foreign Ministers also served for longer than one year.
^'^See Libro Bianco 1985, La Difesa . Each
parliamentary body passed a separate resolution. The
five points listed are those major points both houses
had in common.
^'As this paper was being written, the Craxi
government resigned in accordance with a "power-
sharing" formula reached with the Christian Democratic
Party.
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has permitted the government to proceed with longer-
term policies beneficial to the country. That arms
transfer policies are also affected by this longevity
is logical. Until 1983, the average duration of a
government was ten months. It is possible that
conflicting instructions, governmental crises, and
bureaucratic politics could have allowed the arms
export licensing mechanism to be subverted, or at the
very least, ignored by the key decision makers who were
perhaps, more intent on gaining power than
administering an arms transfer policy.
Italian foreign policy had not undergone any
radical changes since the war. On the contrary, it can
be argued that, notwithstanding the instability of the
government, there is a thread in Italian foreign policy
that has never changed. That particular thread is the
careful cultivation of a friendly relationship with the
Middle East, and specifically, the Arab world. It is
important to note that while policy may generally
endure, as long as there is governmental instability
solid games are more difficult to obtain.
Italy's Middle East policy must be examined by
considering the interests the Rome government has in
maintaining strong, friendly relations. The first
motivation has already been introduced, Italy's desire
to play a role in the Mediterranean. Finally, the
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Italians, mineral poor as they are, require oil to
survive.
These three foreign policy concerns will be
analyzed in the next section to determine if a
relationship exists between the foreign policy outputs
of the Italian government and its arms transfer policy.
G . SUMMARY
There is a tendency in the United States to
separate defense and foreign policy and believe that
they can stand separately. This tendency is not
apparent in Italy. Italian foreign and defense policy
planners realize they must work within the same
international framework, and most important for a
country of Italy's size, they must work together. For
purposes of examination, the two have been separated in
this study; the simple fact is that they are
inseparable. This inseparability forms the basis for
Italy's arms transfer policy. As long as foreign and
defense policy are inseparable and as long as the
defense "side" controls the armaments industries, there
is no way one can remove political considerations from
the arms transfer policy process. This inseparability
constitutes what a leading British historian calls a
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nation's "total strategy". ^2 This "total strategy"
which includes economic, social, political, and
military considerations, is the determinant of Italian
arms transfer policy.
Italian defense and foreign policy, both
declaratory and documented, emphasizes the supremacy of
the NATO commitment and membership in the European
Community. The latest Italian foreign and defense
policy initiatives however, have little to do with
those commitments. Instead, these initiatives are out
of the NATO and EEC context altogether. The most
obvious examples are the Lebanon peacekeeping forces,
the neutrality guarantee to Malta, and the fact that
the Italian government is developing a small, but well-
equipped "rapid deployment force" for use outside of
Italy and NATO.^^ Why should Italy, a country
allegedly only interested in the economic rationales
associated with arms transfers, be willing to undertake
such commitments? Like most countries--economics do
not overshadow the Italian national interest. The
actions Italy has undertaken serve notice that the
Italians are to be taken seriously in the arena of
^^Correlli Barnett as quoted in "The Relationship
Between Foreign and Defense Policy," in RUSI-Journal
for Defence Studies , May 1983, 3.
^^Libro Bianco-La Difesa 1985.
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international affairs. An expression of the Italian
national interest is beginning to appear.
The Italian national interest comprising the three
main foreign policy concerns of oil, the terrorist
problem, and the undiminished Italian desire to play an
important role in the Mediterranean serve as the
foreign and defense policy inputs to the political
rationales that are the basis for Italian arms
transfers. These inputs, coupled with the demonstrated
Italian desire to steer its own course in foreign and
defense policy, form the framework that will guide
Italian arms transfer policy into the next century.
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VI . ITALIAN ARMS TRANSFERS: A DEVELOPING POLICY
Each of the three major foreign policy issues--oil
dependency, terrorism, and the Italian desire for
international acknowledgement of its Mediterranean
role--offers rationales for the transfer of weapons. Of
the three, the oil problem and the role question are
the two most significant motivators. The effect of
terrorism on the nation can be explained as that
catalyst which permitted the people to recognize the
need for a strong defense. In terms of its effects on
the developing arms transfer policy, it can be seen as
a filter, an intervening variable which changes, ever
so slightly, the expected outcome of a response based
on a cause
.
It is for this reason that it is necessary to
examine the impact of terrorism and domestic factors on
the arms transfer policy development process.
A. DOMESTIC ISSUES AND THE EFFECT OF TERRORISM
Concurrent with the oil crises and regime
Instability, Italy, more than any European country, was
plagued by the terrorist wave of the 1970's. The almost
daily incidents, culminating in the murder of Aldo
Moro, the most prominent and able Christian Democratic
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statesman of the day, brougiit the country to the brink
of anarchy.
The main effect of these three threats to Italian
democracy was the almost total concentration on
internal affairs. Such a focus, reversed only in the
early 1980's, precluded any serious concentration of
effort on those external issues that were slowly
building in the iMedi ter ranean .
The country rallied behind the government of
emergency that sought to control the terrorism that ran
rampant. ^^ By the early 1980's, the terrorist incidents
had decreased, but there was no evidence that the "war"
had been won. Concurrently, the uneasy truce between
the parties of the "constitutional arch" was beginning
to weaken. The Dozier incident, in 1982, again brought
the parties together. ^^ By early 1983, the Italian
police and paramilitary forces had not only rescued
General Dozier, but they had also exterminated the "Red
Brigades" in Italy.
The Dozier rescue is a source of pride for all
Italians. It is proof that Italy has control over her
^^The emergency government was an effort by all
parties to put aside parochial interests for the time
being in an attempt to create the unity required to
respond to the terrorist situation.
5^The "Red Brigade" kidnapping of U.S. Army
Brigadier General James Dozier, from his home in
Verona, Italy.
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own future. It also marks the beginning of a new era in
Italian politics.
Bettino Craxi, the first Socialist appointed Prime
Minister, presided over the most enduring government
post-war Italy has seen. Offered the prime minister-
ship at a time when the normally ruling Christian
Democrats were in disarray because of infighting, Craxi
has guided Italy into the independent position she has
attained.
Craxi ' s greatest achievement (as far as Italians
are concerned) was his handling of the Achille Lauro
incident. Polls taken by L' Espresso , and Panorama, in
the wake of the October 11, 1985 American capture of
the Achille Lauro hijackers, expressed irritation and
resentment with the American attitude in the affair.
Sentiments such as "Italy is not a banana republic" and
"Allies but not servants" were being voiced in the
press as well as in the Parliament and are further
proof of a new Italian position.^"
A key element of Craxi ' s leadership has been the
Italian focus on Mediterranean issues. As noted, the
Mediterranean has always lured Italian politicians, but
no leader had been able to take up the quest because of
the eternal domestic problems.
^^See Silvio Senigallia, "Taking on Washington:
Italy's Mideast Strategy," The New Leader , 21 October
1985, 3-4.
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The two domestic factors of terrorism and the Craxi
government's independence have permitted the Italian
government and people to pause in their daily worries
over internal problems and cast a questioning eye
outside the country's boundaries. These two issues have
had an effect on the Italian arms transfer policy
process and will continue to influence Italian defense
and foreign policy for some time.
B. THE "ARMS FOR OIL" POLICY CHOICE
Italy's dependence on foreign oil is no secret. The
country is devoid of any energy resources and depends
completely on the oil-producing nations of the world
for her survival. A basic question that must be
addressed is the extent to which this oil dependency
drove the government to adopt an arms-for-oil strategy
during the 1970 's and the effect the strategy has had
on arms transfer policy since that time.
The major recipients of Italian weapons during the
period from 1970 to 1979 were Libya with some 450
million dollars worth, Iran 350 million dollars, Saudi
Arabia 130 million dollars, and Venezuela 110 million
dollars.-*' Appendix A shows the equipment Italy
exported during the period from 1970 to 1983. These
^'See the Appendix which is a listing of all
Italian arms transfers from 1970-1984.
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four countries, all members of OPEC and major oil
exporters, accounted for fifty-seven percent of the
value of Italian arms transfers to Third World
countries during the period in question. The figures
for the period from 1980 to the present show a decline
in the correlation. This decline is mainly because of
actions taken by the government to deny transfer
licenses to Iran and Libya, although the oil glut has
certainly made the denial of those exports easier by
assuring greater access to the energy.
Laurance, in An Assessment of the Arms-For-Oil
Strategy , suggests that nations may have employed the
arms-for-oil strategy for five major reasons:
1. Regional Internation Stability
2. Internal Stability in Oil-Producing States
3. The General Security of Oil-Producing States
4. General Political Influence
5. Interdependence -'°
This framework provides an appropriate analytical
vehicle for examining the motives Italy may have had in
selling arms-for-oil.
1 . Regional Stability
The Italians stand more to lose in the event of
Middle Eastern conflict than any other Western European
arms producer. First, Italy is absolutely dependent on
^^From Edward A. Laurance, "An Assessment of the
Arms-for- Oil Strategy," in Donald J. Goldstein ed.
Energy and National Security , Washington D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 1981, 59-89.
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Middle Eastern oil; second, and most important, Italy
is located near the probable centers of conflict. Given
the Italian propensity for friendship with the Middle
East, and faced with the real dangers of conflict
spreading into the Mediterranean, Italy's life-line, it
is feasible that regional stability played a role in
Italian considerations of arms transfers to the area.
Although the Italians took no concrete action to
assert themselves in the region in the 1970's, the
Lebanon peacekeeping forces constituted in 1982 and the
Italian mine sweepers sent to the Red Sea in 1984 are
evidence of a growing sense of commitment. In
retrospect, it also seems clear that the "Italian
threats" alluded to by the Defense Ministry and senior
military officers in the mid-1970's referred to fears
spawned by regional instability in the oil producing
nations of the Mid-East. It is logical to assume that
the actions taken by the Italian government to approve
arms exports to the countries of the Middle East that
produce and sell oil to Italy were in some manner
motivated by the desire to assure stability in the
region.
Of course, the weapons sales to Venezuela tend
to counter this regional strategy. However, during the
period in question, Italy only imported some 0.7
percent of its oil needs from that country compared to
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21.6 percent from Saudi Arabia, 15 percent from Libya,




Internal stability had to be considered for many
of the same reasons cited in the discussion of the
regional stability strategy. The Italian government's
dealings with Libya's Colonel Qaddafi have always, at
least until recently, been cordial. This suggests that
the Italians had a vested interest in selling weapons
to a "known quantity," Qaddafi, thereby assuring
themselves of an uninterrupted supply of oil rather
than denying Qaddafi the weapons he desired, perhaps
inadvertently contributing to a coup, and facing an
unknown, perhaps more radical head of state.
3 Insure Capability to Produce and Supply
Although the Italian government has been
concerned about the ability of the Middle Eastern
States to protect themselves and their oil producing
assets, it has taken little action to support them. The
Italian government, consistent with the above analysis
on defense policy, was content to allow the United
States to train and maintain the indigenous forces of
the region. To be sure, the Italians have trained
^^CIA, International Energy Statistical Review, 7
March 1979, as listed in Laurance, An Assessment of the
Arms-for-Oil Strategy. The other major sources of
Italian imports were: Iraq, 12.1%; Kuwait, 8.8%; and
UAE, 3.8%.
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personnel from Middle Eastern countries, but nothing
comparable to the efforts of the United States.
4. Political Influence
The concept of political influence is extremely
amorphous, and because of that, difficult to prove.
Given Italian concerns for oil supplies, it seems
logical that the government would seek political
influence in an effort to insure uninhibited access to
that precious resource. The greatest difficulty arises
when one attempts to define influence. Is influence,
for instance, the power one nation acquires over
another that results in the nation being influenced to
do something it would not ordinarily do? Or, is
influence the benefit one nation gains from having
assisted another nation, a sort of reward? The concept
of influence will be discussed in detail later.
Referring to the arms-for-oil strategy, the logical
conclusion is that Italy gained influence from arms
sales to oil producing nations. The best examples of
such influence (using the reward definition) are the
tremendous investments placed in Italy and in Italian
firms both public and private, by the country of Libya.
The investments, recently revealed and just as recently
liquidated, represent a form of present day offset, but
in reverse. In other words, the arrangement might have
been as follows: Libya is permitted to purchase arms,
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Italy is assured of oil supplies, and Libya further
buys into the Italian industrial establishment
providing much needed foreign currency at a time of
high oil prices.
It appears that the political influence strategy
was employed by Italy, but not in a manner that sought
to influence the policy of a recipient nation. Rather
the Italians were content to maintain or enhance




Interdependency, for many of the same reasons as
were discussed for internal stability, does not seem to
have persuaded Italian decision-makers to approve the
transfers. The government throughout the 1970 's still
depended on the United States to maintain stability in
the region. Secondly, the Italian Republic, while a
major arms exporter, did not export sufficient
quantities to create the circumstances for
interdependency. Lastly, all recipients of Italian arms
had at least one, if not more, alternative suppliers
that, during the lean oil years, supplied more
materials than did the Italians.
6 Summary of the Arms-for-Oil Explanation
The "arms-for-oil strategy" framework emphasizes
those factors that took precedence during the years of
oil crises. More importantly, the framework highlights
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those strategies the Italians have used in the past to
insure access to oil, or more simply stated, their
national interest. Those strategies, regional
stability, internal stability and political influence
are present today as the centerpieces of Italian
foreign and defense policy. ^^
The oil crisis period, the years 1973 to 1979,
were instrumental in the development of Italian arms
transfer policy. Although the threat of oil embargoes
has subsided, the Italian policy makers seem to have
continued with the strategies devised during the late
1970 's, and refined them to their present state.
Perhaps most important, the arms-for-oil
strategy provides proof that the Italian government
had, for the first time, used the arms transfer policy
tool for something other than economic gain or to
assuage the defense industries. The need for oil,
combined with the increased control the government
established in the wake of the Legge Promozionali
,
allowed the government to make full use of the
political aspect of arms transfers.
C. INFLUENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION?
^°See La Difes?--Libro Bianco 1985
,
and 1984: One
Year of Italy's Foreign Policy , both publications of
the Italian government, for a discussion of the
importance of regional stability in the Mediterranean
to Italy.
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The motives for transferring arms that have been
examined thus far are not in and of themselves
sufficient to explain present Italian arms transfer
policy, especially in light of the aforementioned
evolution in foreign and defense policy. There is
something else, an intangible element of the policy
that cannot be explained by economics, arms-for-oil,
and other common explanations for the transfer of
weapons. The concept of influence suggests itself
because it offers the host country the maximum in
benefits from foreign policy decisions, something
compatible with Italian interests.
Quandt defines influence as the ability one country
exercises over another to alter the policy of the
recipient . ^-^ Rubinstein further elaborates:
A country seeks to exercise influence in order to
obtain specific short term advantages, though very
often the motives and consequences of a successful
influence attempt may have the most significance
for the influencer as part of his long-term
objectives. Like breathing, influence becomes
especially noticeable when pressure is applied or
concern heightens. Influence may be considered to
have a certain number of characteristics.
1. It is a relational concept involving "the
transferral of a pattern (of preferences) from a
source (the controlling actor) to a destination
(the responding actor or system) in such a way that
^'William B. Quandt, "Influence Through Arms
Supply: The American Experience in the Middle East," in
Uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfaltzgraff and Geoffrey Kemp eds.
Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup
in Less Industrialized Countries
,
Boulder, CO.:
Westview Press, 1978, 121-129.
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the outcome pattern corresponds to the original
preference pattern.
2. It is issue-specific and situation specific: the
duration of influence is restricted to the life of
the issue or the situation within which it
transpired, and when these change so does the
influence relationship.
3. It tends to be an asymmetrical, mutual
interaction process: there is no fixed pattern of
achievement costs.
4. It is a short lived phenomenon. ^^
Rubinstein's characteristics require two important
ingredients: first, a conscious act by the "controlling
actor" to persuade the "responding actor" of the
former's established ability to influence the
respondent's action; and second, it assumes that the
"controlling actor" has already accumulated some degree
of power that is enough to affect the respondent. If a
controlling actor offers to sell weapons in an attempt
to influence a respondent's behavior, then the
controlling actor must have some superiority over the
respondent in addition to an arms production capability
in order to exercise influence. That superiority could
be economic or military, but it is more likely a
combination of both that is universally recognized.
The definitions of influence suggest a degree of
control and power that is absent from Italian exercises
^^Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet and Chinese
Influence in the Third World , New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1975, 10.
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of influence if the Italian version can indeed be
called influence. In Italy, the key element of power is
present, but it is not recognized by the international
community. It is only of late that the government has
attempted to exercise power in the international system
(thereby demonstrating its pressence). Italy is, of
course, a member of all the alliances and groupings of
the industrialized world, but that has not stopped one
Italian diplomat from noting, "...the tradition of
Italian diplomacy [has been] to be always present,
wherever possible, whatever the reason." This statement
suggests that it has been sufficient for the Italians
to be members of the international system, but they
have not necessarily used it for their own aims, nor
have they attempted to assert themselves in pursuit of
their own national interest."-^ Indeed, in one forum,
NATO, it has been noted that:
...Italy's presence in the alliance is hardly
commensurate to her importance, as the appointments
allotted to Italians in the NATO institutional
machinery demonstrate. Indeed, Italy often fares
worse in this regard than do smaller partners.
...Italy's silent partnership has convinced others
that her claims can be appeased at small cost.°^
^
-^ Ambas sador Roberto Ducci, as quoted in
Caligaris, "Italian Defence Policy: Problems and
Prospects .
"
^^Caligaris, "Italian Defence Policy: Problems and
Prospects," 72.
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The research on the concept of influence in arms
transfers has generally concentrated on the
superpowers. Quandt, Rubinstein, and Cahn have written
about the effects and uses of influence in the Third
World as it relates to the superpowers.^^ In examining
the Italian case the research and findings on influence
do not fit. This is not unique to Italy, but to other
arms exporters that do not fit the "great power" or the
"second-tier supplier" definition. An underlying theme,
for instance, in the analyses of United States
influence relationships starts with the premise that
influence is used in an adversarial manner, i.e. to
deter an action by a recipient state. This is a valid
use of influence, but because of the difference in
size, economy, and power between Italy and the United
States, such a premise is not valid. There are
similarities, but the influence attempts of a country
the size of Italy cannot be compared to the great
powers
.
It seems clear that the Italian government's arms
transfer policy has changed. It is also clear that the
Italians stand to gain from an increased use of the
"^In addition to the works of Quandt and
Rubinstein already noted, see also Anne Hessing Cahn,
"United States Arms to the Middle East 1967-76: A
Critical Examination," in Milton Leitenberg ed. Great
Power Intervention in the Middle East , New York:
Pergamon Press, 1979, 101-125.
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arms transfer foreign policy tool. The difference is in
the power aspect; or, more appropriately, the
difference lies in the desired result of the
application of some form of power. The Italians do not
seem to be employing influence as a policy tool.
Ranher, the Italians are using their newly discovered
power and the world demands for security assistance to
seek prestige.
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VII. PRESTIGE: THE NEW ITALIAN POLICY
The Oxford American dictionary defines prestige
as "respect for a person [or nation] resulting from his
good reputation, past achievements, etc."^^ Another way
of expressing the concept of prestige in the nation-
state context is to call it international stature.
Prestige can be seen as an evolutionary aspect of a
nation's arms transfer policy, a point between policy
driven by economic rationales and policy that attempts
to change the actions of nations--inf luence.
Prestige for a nation-state could be described as
the earned respect of other, important states resulting
from a good reputation as evidenced by participation in
international organizations or peace-keeping efforts, a
good reputation for maintaining its word on difficult
policy issues, or the reputation a nation gains from
the design, development, and export of high-
technology, reliable weapons systems. The United
States, for example, has reached the utmost in prestige
for its weapons systems. Because of political and
humanitarian concerns, however, its prestige is
tarnished because of it seeming inability to keep its
^^Oxford American Dictionary , New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980, 528.
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word. A prime example was the political inability of
the Reagan Administration to sell certain weapons
systems to the Kingdom of Jordan after the President
had promised the sale. This is, of course, a simplistic
example, but for the majority of Third World countries,
a man's word is his bond. The United States, however,
does not need to rely on prestige to make weapons
sales, to protect itself, to gain influence, or to make
its voice heard in the international system. Italy does
not have that luxury and depends on the good will it
cultivates in the world.
The difference between prestige and influence is
one of a state of action. Influence is an active policy
that actively seeks to sway a nation's actions.
Prestige, on the other hand, is a passive policy
choice. The actor nation, while it welcomes the effects
of prestige, is not actively pursuing that result.
Instead, it is enough for the actor nation to provide
the circumstances and await the forthcoming result. A
nation seeking prestige does so because it lacks the
basic power necessary to use arms-for-inf luence as a
policy tool, but has moved beyond a necessity to export
arms for solely economic reasons.
A basic question that must be addressed in the
issue of prestige is, what does a country stand to
gain? The conventional wisdom on influence generally
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agrees that a nation will attempt to exercise influence
if it has the capability and opportunity. That exercise
of influence is linked to that countries national
interest.
Prestige is also linked to a country's national
interest, but is checked by the lack of the element of
power noted above. A country seeks prestige to:
1. Gain recognition as a great power in the
international system, and to gain the acceptance
and respect of greater powers.





As a domestic tool to demonstrate a government's
effectiveness
.
4. To further boost sales of weapons, through the
reputation factor.
5 As a "stepping stone" to the exercise of
influence
.
A. RECOGNITION AS A GREAT POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM
In Italy's case, recognition as a great power is
her first priority and has been so since the end of the
War. Not only is this concept addressed in the White
Paper, it is also a central issue in each party's
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platform. A recent English language publication of the
Italian Foreign Ministry amplifies this point:
...Italy's government has sought out its own room
for action on the international scene, has made
known its belief that the time is right for taking
initiatives that will pick up the threads of [East-
West and North-South] dialogue again... In the
western camp, besides her intense consultations
with her European partners, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, and Great Britain in particular--
these having been favored by their common
membership in NATO and the EEC--she has won a
relationship of special confidence with the
American administration ^ witness to this being the
not few letters exchanged between Prime Minister
Craxi and President Reagan, on the most burning
questions of the day.°'
A country seeking recognition must, of necessity,
do something to create attention and build respect;
arms exports fulfill both requirements. From February
1985 to June 1986, for instance, there were a
tremendous number of exchange visits between the
People's Republic of China and the Republic of Italy.
These visits, the first of their kind in recent years,
were accomplished by senior officers of both countries'
defense establishments. These visits came in the wake
of the signing of a bilateral agreement by Italian
Defense Minister Spadolini and China's Defense Minister
^"^Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1984: One Year of
Italy's Foreign Policy , in Italy Documents and Notes,
Rome: 1986. 3-34.
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Zhang Aiping which "...provides a general framework
within which specific arras deals may be concluded. "^^
China is especially important to the Italians
because of its size and market potential, but most
importantly because of its strategic significance and
importance in international affairs. The "opening" of
China has been much discussed in the United States and
is seen, in a strategic sense, as an opportunity for
capitalism to triumph over communism. The importance of
China's international position is not lost on Italian
governmental leaders, those that approved the bilateral
relationship in the first place. If Italy is in a
position to provide China the weapons she needs to
defend herself, then clearly Italy stands to gain.
Secondly, and more importantly, the "goodwill"
generated by the export of weapons (and probably
technology) to China provides Italy the opportunity to
raise her international standing not only among the
superpowers, but among important Third World nations
that look to China for guidance.
Another example of the Italian quest for great
power recognition is the case of Brazil and the AMX
aircraft. Why would a modern, industrialized country
like Italy, a member of the strongest military alliance
^^"Current News," Jane's Defence Weekly , 10 April
1985.
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in the world be willing not only to co-produce, but
also co-design a new generation of fighter? Albrecht
argues that such coproduction is based on purely
economic aims, that Italy is only seeking markets. ^^
In the framework of prestige, however, the production
agreements appear to make more sense. Aware that Brazil
has the potential of becoming a great power in the not
too distant future, Italian politicians are assuring
themselves of Brazilian recognition and friendship. A
side effect that certainly is calculated is the effect
such arrangements have on the United States. Arms
transfers involving technology are of great interest to
the U.S.
B. RECOGNITION AS A LOCAL POWER
It appears that prestige is also related to the
second, very attainable goal of major regional power
status for Italy, rather than mere economic
realizations. In the February 9, 1987 edition of
CAMBIO 16 , a Spanish news magazine, Giovanni Spadolini
hinted at what appears to be a new Italian policy. The
interview was entitled, "A ^Contadora' for
Mediterranean Peace," a reference to the Latin American
group attempting to maintain peace in Central
^^Albrecht, 142.
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America.'''^ Participants at the meeting included the
Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Defense
Ministers of both Spain and Italy. When asked about the
subject of the talks, Spadolini answered that the
discussion had centered around Mediterranean security
and the role Italy and Spain may play in that goal. He
expressed concern about the situation in the
Mediterranean and asserted a belief that it can only be
righted by a concerted effort of the Mediterranean
countries
.
In response to a question about the military
technology assistance Spain could expect from the
Italians, Spadolini replied that the key to the future
lay in c o -pr oduc t ion . He emphasized that such
cooperation would of necessity require technology
transfer and intimated that there would be no
difficulty in such arrangements. While the Spanish
armaments industry is capable, it lacks the
sophistication of the Italians. Spadolini's comments
regarding the possibility of technology transfer are an
example of the pursuit of regional power status. The
unspoken comment in the interview was, "As long as
Spain supported Italy's leadership in this 'Contadora'
process, the technology would be forthcoming."
'^See Francisco Rivera, "Un <<Contadora>> para la
paz en el Mediterraneo, " CAMBI016 , 9 February 1987, 66.
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It is possible that the agreements concluded at
that conference, while not yet public, are an exchange
of military assistance for the recognition and prestige
that Italy desires. This recognition is not influence.
There is no discernable attempt by the Italian
government to influence the internal politics of Spain.
It is, however, an exercise in prestige. The Spanish
government is not being coerced into supporting the
Italians. Instead it appears they are being co-opted.
Italy's announced foreign and defense policy, in this
case at least, can be used as a map to plot the
Italians' future directions, at least in the
Mediterranean.
A second example of Italy's new rationale is to be
found in the arms export relationship with Somalia. In
October 1985 after a visit to Somalia, Prime Minister
Craxi pledged his full support for Somalia and
indicated that he was prepared to approve the transfer
of some 100 M-47 tanks to demonstrate Italy's support.
Additionally, Craxi announced that Italy would improve
its military assistance in the technical field and also
train more Somalian officers at Italian military
schools . ' '-
"^^As reported in Jane's Defence Weekly , October
12, 1985, 784.
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The former colonial ties between Italy and Somalia
may have had a small part in this arms transfer
decision, but it is best seen as another example of
Italian prestige-building in the local region. If Italy
is willing to openly support Somalia in its war against
Ethiopia, then Italy must be recognized as a force in
the region. Moreover, the Italian government proved it
was willing to stand up for its allies, thereby proving
itself trustworthy and worthy of respect. It is
important to remember that in that region of the
world--in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn
of Africa--the bonds between nations are shaped by the
respect one nation has for another.
There are two reasons for the decision to support
Somalia. First, the Italians still feel some attachment
to their ex-colony and therefore are willing to approve
sales that can help it retain its independence. Second,
the political gains involved with the sale, especially
because of the situation in Somalia and the threat of
war, are potentially high. Those political gains can be
translated into increased prestige and increased
political presence in the area. All these gains are the
precursors to the exercise of influence.
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C. DOMESTIC POLITICAL TOOL
The Italians have developed a formidable industrial
base capable of competing with any European
manufacturer; and although the high technology trend
seems to be co-production, the technology base is
present in Italy. An important part of the new
rationale is the desire to be recognized as a power.
Italians are proud of their achievements; and after so
many years of being a sec6nd class country, they are
ready to move up. The best example of this new pride is
the Italian reaction to their exclusion at the Group of
Seven meeting in Paris. By walking out, the Italians
served notice they no longer wish to be used; they are
now demanding to be consulted. Finally, a recent
Italian survey indicates that even without the "black
economy," Italy's GNP now surpasses that of Great
Britain. "^2 pQj; the Italians this is something to be
proud of and to maintain.
National pride is difficult to measure, but how
many Americans, for instance, do not feel a sense of
satisfaction when a European airline announces it will
buy American aircraft because they are the best? Apart
from the obvious capitalistic em.otions, such an
72rp^g
"black economy" refers to that sector which
is unknown to and uncontrolled by the government.
Normally it consists of the second jobs held by workers
for which no taxes are paid.
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announcement gives the listener a certain sense of
superiority, an "ours is the best" attitude. So it is
in Italy. Too long have Italians been forced to be the
recipients. For the first time, Italian technology, in
the form of modern weapons, is in demand in the world.
The initiatives discussed above--China, Brazil,
Spain and Somalia--are only a sampling of the foreign
policy actions undertaken by Bettino Craxi and his
government. The Italian political system is much too
complicated to be discussed here.
D. THE EFFECTS ON SALES
Although economic rationales are not central to
Italian arms transfer decision-making, economic factors
are considered. In the pursuit of prestige, the
economic factors actually can be instrumental. If the
United States Air Force had purchased the Northrop F-20
aircraft, then that aircraft probably would have been
purchased by other countries. Lacking the sale to the
Air Force, the F-20 program died. This is an example of
prestige as a sales vehicle. Similarly, one reason
Third World countries buy US weapons is because they
are perceived as having the highest prestige value.
Buying weapons, or more accurately, the granting of
export licenses, is a positive act by a supplier
country that says, "I accept you as a sovereign nation,
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mature enough to handle these weapons." Such implicit
approval also raises the prestige of the recipient
country.
The intriguing question is which comes first? That
is, must a supplier nation be prestigious before a
recipient nation will buy, or does a nation gain
prestige by sales to a recipient nation? It appears
that there is no clear answer. Rather the answer is a
combination of the two concepts.
For Italy, prestige gained from the sale of weapons
to other nations adds an intangible component to a
weapons system that increases its value. In practical
terms, this increase in value translates to more
prestige, then more sales, meaning more prestige, that
will or could eventually be used as influence once the
requisite power is attained.
Malaysia, a small Southeast Asian country, recently
invited Italian officials to that country for talks:
Malaysia is seeking to interest Italy in using the
South East Asian country as a manufacturing base
for defence equipment sales in the region. The
invitation to a foreign country to use Malaysia as
a manufacturing base for sales in the region marks
a shift of policy for the [Malaysian government].
While they are interested in creating a local arms
industry, production was [to be] purely for
internal consumption. ...Malaysia purchased four
mine countermeasure vessels in mid-1986 and Italy
provided training for the Malaysian personnel
associated with these vessels. The possibility of
extending the training to other sectors of the navy
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is under study at the Italian and Malaysian defence
ministries. -^
Why did the Malaysians choose Italy? Why not
Brazil, a member of the Third World? In reading the
article one gets the impression that since the
Malaysians were satisfied with the training and
equipment the Italians had provided in 1986, they chose
to continue with a proven supplier. This simple
explanation may be close to the truth. Italy had gained
prestige in its sales of 1986, and that prestige was a
factor in the decision to expand the Malaysian arms
industry, inviting an outside nation to assist.
In such a situation, Italy stands only to gain. Not
only did she export weapons, but those weapons were the
key that opened up new possibilities that, though
initially are centered on economic issues, could
possibly develop into influence at a later date.
F. STEPPING STONE TO INFLUENCE
All of the explanations of Italian arms transfers
have concentrated on the prestige factor. The prestige
factor is one step removed from influence. Because of
that and because the Italians have been on the
receiving end of influence for so many years, they are
'•^"Malaysia Woos Italy in Joint-Venture Sales
Plan," Jane's Defence Weekly
, 14 February 1987, 218.
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well aware of the gains to be made by exercising
influence. As already noted, the opportunity, however,
has never presented itself. As the arms industry
continues to increase in competitiveness and as the
government builds up national prestige, the Italians
will be able to use the influence tool as a foreign
policy weapon.
G. SUMMARY
Not all countries of the industrialized world are
capable of exercising influence, either through
diplomacy or arms exports as policy tools. The simple
fact is that a nation must have established itself on
the international scene before any exercise of
influence can be attempted. This process of
establishing national credentials is called prestige.
A nation seeks prestige with any of five policy
goals in mind. The first, recognition by other powers,
allows the country to establish itself in the
international arena, and, in a sense, have its power
validated by the other great powers of the
international system. This Italy has accomplished
through technology transfer. Closely related to the
concept of international recognition is the idea of
regional acceptance. This second goal allows Italy to
become in a sense the local "hegemon", reinforcing
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international recognition, while seeking prestige. This
goal had been accomplished by trading Italian
modernity in weapons manufacturing for tacit acceptance
of a leadership role. Third, Italy's government has
used the newly acquired recognition to further its own
domestic political goals. Although the government has
called for early elections (something typical for
Italians) the successes won by the judicious transfer
of arms as a policy tool have made an impression on
those who seek the highest offices. The fourth effect
of prestige has reinforced Italy's position in the
world markets as an arms manufacturer, while continuing
to contribute to her reputation. Finally, the quest for
prestige is not an end, rather a step along the way. If
they have not already recognized this fact, the
Italians are sure to do so in the future and will





In concluding his article on Italian arms exporting
strategies, Albrecht states, "The flow of arms exports
from the European countries, as opposed to those from
superpowers, must be interpreted primarily as an
outgrowth of economic and industrial policies, rather
than foreign policy."'^
The results of this study suggest that Albrecht ' s
statement is not entirely true, at least in the case of
Italy. There are three major reasons for this finding:
increased governmental control, a reduced importance of
the economic rationale, and an awakening of the
national conscience.
The government has of late made a concerted effort
to not only exert its control over the industry, but to
streamline and make more efficient those steps
necessary for arms transfer approval. An industry that
is controlled by the government is more susceptible to
controls--when they are exercised--than is an industry
that is privately owned, like most industries in the
other arms producing giants.
Italian observers have long noted that although
Italy paid lip service to arms transfer restraints and
^^Albrecht, 142.
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controls, there never seemed to be any substance. The
research suggests that this may have been true, up to
ten years ago. But since then, Italy has joined the
ranks of those nations that have positive controls over
their arms export industries.
Those that subscribe to the conventional wisdom
argue that economics, as an arms transfer rationale, is
more and more widespread; and according to some
experts, is a sign of future trends in the arms
industry. To argue that economics do not play a role in
today's arms export decisions is foolhardy. But
economics are not the main determinant of arms export
policy for Italy. Instead, as the Italian economy
grows, economics will have a smaller and smaller effect
on the decision-making process.
Until 1978, the major influences in export
agreements centered on the arms-for-oil issue. There
occurred concurrently an awakening of the collective
national conscience in the areas of foreign and defense
policy. That new impetus in the foreign and defense
policy field will be the prime rationale for future
arms transfer agreements.
A primary aim of the government is to bolster the
effectiveness of the Italian defense industries.
Minister Spadolini is committed to increasing the
traditionally weak, underfunded research and
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development departments of the industry. Rapid
technological developments threatened to leave Italy in
the position of the Third World arms producers, that
i.e. dependent on technology from the more advanced
states.
The plan for industry is not isolated. At the same
time industry is being revitalized, the aim of
reasserting the power of the country is to take place.
This new venture is already underway and assumes two
main forms. The first is the area of weapons sales and
export licenses, and the second uses the lure of
technology to further the political aims.
Concurrently, the export procedures have been
revamped in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign
Trade. An examination of the latest arms transfer
agreements indicates that Italy is moving in a new
direction of a more critical appraisal of the transfer
requests. Moreover, the government has announced and
for the first time the data validate the bans in effect
for such countries as South Africa and Libya. The
furor over the role the Italian government may have had
in the U.S. -Iran arms scandal is indicative of a new
sensitivity to arms transfers--at least indiscriminate
ones
.
The first thing a student of Italian politics and
culture learns is that nothing about Italy is one
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dimensional. Economics and industrial policy are
important for all arms producing countries. It is,
however, but one facet of those countries' motives for
the export of arms. Italy is no different, especially
in light of the developing foreign and defense policy.
The Italian rationale for the export of weapons is
primarily politically motivated and will remain so for
the foreseeable future. Economics and industrial policy
are important, but not supreme.
The present day heirs to the traditions of
Machiavelli are finally gaining control of an industry
and policy that has gone too long ignored. Because of
their heritage, they are more than ever likely to seek
other benefits from such a sensitive business.
The political will to have Italy reassert itself as
a major European power is present, although the
political courage to accomplish this task remains to be
demonstrated. Italians have an adventurous and
imaginative spirit. Time will tell.
As Italy gains confidence, as her citizens become
used to a new international respect for things Italian,
and as the government realizes its ability to choose in
the foreign and defense policy field, Italy will move
towards using influence as a policy tool. The first
result of this new self confidence will be the
establishment of a local alliance, within the NATO
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framework, of southern tier countries that will
coordinate defense activities on this important flank.
The immediate future of Italian arms transfer
policy is not so clear. Although Italy has broken away
from strict subservience to the United States on
weapons issues and although she is independently
pursuing new technology, she will have to continue on
her path slowly because of US export restraints and
rules. It does seem clear, however, that Italy's
"Merchant of Death" days are over and that she is
determined to use the arms transfer policy as a tool of
government, rather than a crutch for industry.
A. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In the process of writing and researching this
study two problems became evident. First, with the
exception of work done by Robert Harkavy, Edward
Kolodziej , and Ulrich Albrecht, there has been little
interest in examining the motives and processes of
other major European countries in the area of arms
transfer policy. Instead, the major authors devote
their attention to the "big two", the United States and
the Soviet Union. While this is not surprising given
the volume of exports of those two countries, the rise
of " second- tier " producers--Brazil , Israel, South
Africa and India- -emphas i zes the importance of
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examining the policies of smaller countries. The simple
fact of the matter is that there are only two countries
in the world that behave in a manner similar to the
United States and the Soviet Union--themselves
!
Because the two superpowers are so interesting, the
research has used their rationales, their motives, and
their desires to formulate generalizations for the
other, less powerful arms producers. That leaves the
student of European political process, mainly those
students of West Germany and Italy without any basis
from which to start. Italy, for instance, a country
that is still in many ways the bridge to the Third
World, is closer to some Third World producers than
most other developed countries. It follows that
research based on findings that are applicable to Italy
could be used in examining Brazil or Israel.
The second major difficulty, related to the first,
is the lack of theoretical frameworks for examining
countries other than the big two. The best example of
this problem is the concept of influence. Influence has
been examined, analyzed, and defined by the finest
scholars in both the arms transfer field and the
broader, international relations field. The results of
those examinations are generalizations only
infrequently applicable to the emerging powers,
especially those in the armaments business.
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B. A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK
Figure 8 . 1 depicts a framework that may prove
useful in the examination of a country that is
developing an arms industry. The basic premise is that
the country goes through a process of evolution
starting as an importer and ending as a country that is
able to wield influence.
The first phase is marked by an absolute dependency
on arms imports for survival. This phase can be likened
to Italy's status at the end of World War II. Although
accepted by the West, Italy was prevented from
manufacturing arms, thereby creating an abject
dependency on the United States. Another example is the
case of South Africa.
The second phase is characterized by the start of
indigenous production. Generally, the imports continue
but the nation has developed an industry, obtained
licenses, and is able to begin meeting its own needs,
reducing its dependency on other nations.
As the indigenous industries develop, there will be
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stages of this phase an excess capacity that must find
an outlet in the foreign markets. This phase is the
Export for Economics or Export for Currency phase. As
the national government seeks to balance its budget and
cut defense costs, it encourages and seeks markets for
Its defense goods. The prime motivation for sales would
be to lower unit costs, but also to maintain the home
Industry.
The fourth phase, Export for Prestige phase is a
cumulation of the stages thus far. By this time imports
have faded, indigenous industries have matured, but the
economic factors are still present and although not as
Important, still must be addressed. This phase marks
the beginning of the use of arms transfers as a policy
tool and is characterized by the trade of modernity, of
technological prowess that is sought by other less
developed nations, and of a concentration on exhibits
and trade fairs that serve as showcases for the nations
accomplishments. The key aspect of the prestige stage
is that the nation is still maturing, still developing
its strategy for dealing with other actors on the
international stage.
The final stage is Exports for Influence. At this
point the nation's prestige and power are recognized by
the rest of the world, and it is able to exercise the
power gained from this prestige to influence its less
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powerful neighbors. The United States and the Soviet
Union are at this stage. Economics or resources are
still important, but the power of the nation has been
recognized by the other players.
The framework needs further development and
requires further tests. An ideal test would be to
examine a country such as Brazil, that should be In the
third phase, that one dominated by economics, to see
whether the framework is valid. If the framework only
offers an idea for the examination of countries that
are not on the US and USSR scale, then its utility will
have been proven.
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APPENDIX ITALIAN ARMS EXPORT AGREEMENTS
Year Country Weapons Type Lie Prod Amouni
1970 Belgium TRN 36
1970 Congo TRN 12
1971 Argentina TRN 8
1971 Ethiopia Hal yes 12
1971 "Rwanda LP 3
1971 South Africa Trp 40
1971 South Africa Trp ?
1971 Singapore Trn 16
1971 "Tanzania Hel 2
1971 "Tanzania Hel 2
1971 Turkey AswHel yes 3
1971 "Uganda Hel yes 6
1971 "Uganda Hel yes 6







1972 South Africa Trn/Str
1972 Venezuela SSM
1972 Venezuela SSM









































1974 Dubai Trn 1
1974 Dubai Trn/COIN ?
1974 Greece Hel yes 40
1974 Greece APC 300
1974 Iran Hel yes 6
1974 Iran Hel yes 75
1Q74 Malaysia Hel yes 75
1974 Norway ShSM ?
1974 Oman Hel yes ?
1974 Peru SAM ?
1974 Peru FRG 2
1974 Peru ShShM 96
1974 ROC Sub 3
1974 South Africa Trn/COIN 100
1974 "South Africa LP 12
1974 Tunisia Trn 12
1974 Turkey Ftr yes 40 + 18
1974 »UAE Hel yes 6
1974 Venezuela SAM ?
1974 Venezuela SSM 13
1974 Zaire Str 2
1975 Argentina Trp 3
1975 Brazil Trn/COIN 40
1975 Denmark ShAM 7
1975 FRG How ?
1975 Gabon PB 2
1975 Libya Hel yes 28
1975 "Libya PC 4
1975 Netherlands ShShM 100
1975 Peru AAM 72
1975 Peru ShShM 288
1975 Philippines Trn 16
1975 South Africa Asw/Hel yes 3
1975 South Africa AAM 72
1975 Saudi Arabia AA Guns ?
1975 Tunisia Trp 3
1975 Turkey F104 yes 18
1975 Turkey F104 yes 4
1975 Turkey AAM 200
1975 UAE Hel yes 4
1975 UAE Trp 1
1975 Venezuela SAM 144
1975 Venezuela FRG 6
1975 Venezuela ShShM 48
1976 Dubai Trp 1
1976 Ghana Trn 9
1976 Ghana COIN 6
1976 Greece AAM 120
12C
1976 Greece ShAM 120
1976 Indonesia Hel yes 16
1976 Iran Hel 2
1976 Ireland COIN/Trn 10
1976 Libya Hel yes 1
1976 Morocco Trn 28
1976 Peru AswHel yes 6
1976 Peru Hel yes 14
1976 ROC ShShM 24
1976 Syria AswHel yes 12
1976 Syria Hel yes 6
1976 Syria Trp yes 8
1976 Syria Trp yes 2
1976 Thailand Fpb 4
1976 Tunisia Trn/COIN 12
1976 Turkey Hel yes 56
1976 Turkey Hel yes 10
1976 Venezuela Hel 8
1976 Venezuela Hel yes 10
1976 Venezuela ShAM 48
1977 Algeria Cpb 10
1977 Comoros COIN 3
1977 Ecuador FRG 1
1977 Ecuador Trn 12
1977 Ecuador Lst 7
1977 Egypt Trn yes 20
1977 Egypt ShShM 24
1977 FRG MBT 600
1977 Libya ShShM 168
1977 Libya COIN 60
1977 Morocco AAM 24
1977 Niger ShShM 36
1977 Oman Hel yes 7
1977 Peru Hel yes 7
1977 Peru FRG 2
1977 ROK APC 150
1977 South Africa SPH yes 50
1977 South Africa APC yes 400
1977 Saudi Arabia Hel yes 2
1977 Saudi Arabia Hel yes 2
1977 Syria Hel yes 18
1977 Syria Hel yes 12
1977 Syria Hel yes 4
1977 Tanzania Hel yes 2
1977 Zambia Hel 10
1978 Austria Hel yes 24
1978 Bolivia Trn/COIN 6
1978 Ecuador PC 6
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1978 Ecuador PC 6
1978 Greece Asw/Hel yes 12
1978 Iran Frg 6
1978 Iran AShM 100
1978 Libya Hel yes 1
1978 Libya Hal yes 20
1978 Libya Trp 20
1978 Libya MBT Leopard yes 210
1978 Libya MET Lion 200
1978 Libya Tra 260
1978 Morocco Hel yes 6
1978 Niger Trn/Fga 5
1978 Niger ShAM 16
1978 Niger CPB 15
1978 Spain AswHel yes 12
1978 Spain Hel yes 6
1978 UAE MBT Leop yes 20
1978 UAE MBT Lion 20
1978 UAE LP 4
1978 Zaire Trn 9
1978 Zambia Hel 16
1978 Zambia Trn 18
1978 Zimbabwe COIN 17
1979 Argentina Hel 6
1979 Argentina ShAM 96
1979 Burma Trn/COIN 9
1979 Congo CPB 3
1979 Dubai MBT Leop yes 20
1979 Ecuador AAM 7
1979 Ecuador PC 6
1979 Egypt AAM 7
1979 Egypt Frg 2
1979 Indonesia Trn 6
1979 Iraq ShAM 7
1979 Iraq ShShM 7
1979 Iraq Tkr 1
1979 Lebanon Hel yes 6
1979 Lebanon Fac(P) 6
1979 Libya AC 7
1979 Libya APC yes ?
1979 Morocco Hel 6
1979 Morocco Hel yes 7
1979 South Africa ADS ?
1979 Singapore COIN/Trn 6
1979 Somalia APC 7
1979 Somalia Trp 4
1979 Somalia Trp 4
1979 Somalia COIN 6
1979 Somalia LP 6
1979 Spain ShAM 7
1979 Tunisia Hel yes 18
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1979 Tunisia AFC 120
1979 Zaire COIN 8
1980 Argentina Trn 10
1980 Brazil Frg 7
1980 Brazil Sub 9
1980 Brazil PC 12
1980 Egypt Hel yes 15
1980 Egypt FAC 6
1980 "Egypt He] yes 4
1980 Greece Hel yes 6
1980 Iraq PC 6
1980 Iraq Hel yes 6
1980 Iraq Frg 4
1980 Iraq Sub 7
1980 Iraq Hel yes 6
1980 Iraq Tkr 1
1980 Lebanon PB 5
1980 Libya Hel 7
1980 Morocco Hel yes 19
1980 Morocco Hel yes 6
1980 Morocco Hel yes 5
1980 Pakistan LP 100
1980 Peru APC 10
1980 Portugal Hel 12
1980 Somalia Hel yes 12
1980 Spain Hel yes 3
1980 Tanzania Hel yes 2
1980 Thailand FAC(G) 5
1980 Turkey Hel yes 12
1980 Yemen Hel yes ?
1980 Yemen Hel yes 1
1980 Zambia Hel yes 7
1981 Brunei Trn/COIN 2
1981 Burma Trn 3
1981 Egypt Hel 4
1981 Egypt ADS ?
1981 Greece Trp 30
1981 Iraq AAM 224
1981 Iraq ShShM 60
1981 Libya ShShM 7
1981 Libya SPH 210
1981 Malaysia Sweep 4
1981 Peru Trn/Str 14
1981 Peru AC 15
1981 Seychelles PC 1
1981 Somalia LP 2
1981 •Thailand FAC 3
1981 UAE Hel yes 1
1981 Zaire COIN ?
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1982 Brazil Hel yes 6
1982 Cameroon AA Btry 6
1982 Ghana Trn 8
1982 Greece SAM ?
1982 Haiti Trn/COIN 6
1982 Haiti Trn 6
1982 Libya FAC(M) 4
1982 Malaysia Trp 12
1982 Morocco SAM ?
1982 Niger Trp 5
1982 Niger SPH 25
1982 Peru Trp 6
1982 Peru COIN/Trn 50
1982 Saudi Arabia APC 200
1982 Somalia COIN ?
1982 UAE Trn 5
1982 Zimbabwe Trn 10
1983 Egypt AAM 32
1983 Leso Hel yes 2
1983 Libya PC 4
1983 Niger Sweep 1
1983 Niger Trn/Str 12
1983 Oman SPH ?
1983 Saudi Arabia HOW 200
1983 Singapore Trn 30
1983 Somalia MBT {M47 Patton) 100
1983 Thailand AAM 24
1983 UAE MBT 40
1983 Venezuela Trp 8
1983 Venezuela PC 6
1983 Zimbabwe Hel yes 2
1984 Haiti Trn 4
1984 Iraq Hel ?
1984 Iraq AswHel yes 8
1984 Peru AswHel yes 8
1984 Spain Hel yes 28
1984 Spain Hel yes 12
1984 UAE COIN 4
* Estimated order dates based on delivery date and an average
of two years delivery time.
Sources: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 1967-1983, and Louscher , David J. and Salomone,
Michael D. Assessing the Relationship between Technology





Annex 1 to Appendix
Abbreviations and Acronyms for Weapons and Weapons Systems
AA Anti-Aircraft
AAM Air to Air Missile
AC Armored Car
ADS Air Defense System
AEV Armored Engineer Vehicle
AEW Armored Early Warning System
AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle
ALV Amphibious Landing Vehicle
APC Armored Personnel Carrier
ASM Air to Surface Missile
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
ASWHEL Anti-Submarine Warfare Helicopter
CPB Coastal Patrol Boat
COIN Counter Insurgency
CORV Corvette





ICV Infantry Combat Vehicle
LP Light Plane




SAM Surface to Air Missile
SPH Self Propelled Howitzer
SSM Surface to Surface Missile
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